2-15 April 1917

Statue of Lenin outside the Finland Station, St Petersburg

The Finland Station, on Petrograd’s Vyborg side, shortly before midnight on 3 April 1917: workers and soldiers, with red flags and banners, fill the station hall; and there is a military band. The square outside is packed with automobiles and tank-like armoured cars; and the cold night air is blue with smoke. A mounted searchlight sweeps over the faces of the crowd and across the facades of the building, momentarily lighting up the tram-lines and the outlines of the city beyond. There is a general buzz of expectation: Lenin’s train is due.
(Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy , London 1996)

3 April

Lenin and his party arrived in Petrograd on April 3 at 11.10 p.m. It happened to be the final day of the All-Russian Bolshevik Conference, and his followers prepared him for a welcome accorded to no other political figure in post-tsarist Russia. As the train pulled into Finland station, a band struck up the ‘Marseillaise’; outside the terminal stood an armoured car illuminated by a projector. Lenin mounted the car to deliver a short message, and then, followed by a crowd, rode to Kshesinskaia’s villa. There he delivered a speech whose militancy stupefied everyone present. Its thrust was that the transition from the ‘bourgeois’ phases of the revolution to the socialist one had to be accomplished in a matter of weeks rather than years … Later that day Lenin read to his followers a document which came to be known as ‘the April Theses’. It impressed most members of his audience as written by someone out of touch with reality, if not positively mad. Lenin proposed renunciation of the war; immediate transition to the next phase of the Revolution; denial of any support to the Provisional Government; transfer of all power to the soviets; dissolution of the army in favour of a people’s militia; confiscation of landlord property and nationalization of all land; integration of Russia’s financial institutions into a single National Bank under soviet supervision; soviet control of production and distribution; and creation of a new International.
(Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution , London 1995)

Memoir by the Menshevik Nikolai Sukhanov
I cannot forget that speech, like a flash of lightning, which shook and astonished not only me, a heretic accidentally thrown into delirium, but also the true believers. I aver that no one had expected anything like it. It seemed as if all the elemental forces had risen from their lairs and the spirit of universal destruction, which knew no obstacles, no doubts, neither human difficulties nor human calculations, circled in Ksheskinskaia’s hall above the heads of the enchanted disciples.
(N.N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917: a Personal Record , Oxford 1955)

Report in The Times (from our own correspondent in the Balkan peninsula)
General Brusiloff: I greatly esteem the Council of Labour Deputies, but the order which it issued at first entailed much harm. As is known, it states that officers must be chosen by the soldiers. Such a thing has never been seen. There is no such army in the whole world. If there were it would not be an army, but a mob. This was more dangerous because of its possible results behind the front. Here there is complete solidarity between the officers and soldiers in the trenches. This order is not so pernicious at the front, where it failed to destroy discipline and comradeship, as it did in the rear. There the effect was really destructive in many places – not in our Army, be it said to its honour, but in the remote rear of Russia … Those who think that the war can now be ended or that the country can be saved without going ahead are mistaken. To beat the enemy one must go ahead, for he who advances wins. Lastly, the Germans occupy a large area of our country, and all this must be won back.
('General Brusiloff’s Warning', The Times )

4 April

Cable from German agent in Stockholm to Berlin: ‘Lenin’s entry into Russia was successful. He is working exactly as we desire.’
(Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution , London 1995)

Resolution of workers of the Petrograd Pipe Factory, printed in Izvestiia
We, the workers of shop no. 3 at the Petrograd Pipe Factory, having assembled in a meeting of 2,600, are deeply indignant at the persecution on the part of the bourgeois press and various dark and ignorant persons who, while trying to sow hostility between workers and soldiers, say that the workers are not working but only demanding an increase in their wages and an eight-hour day. This, comrade soldiers, is not true. We appreciate the gravity of the present moment and, aware that our brothers and fathers are sitting there in the damp trenches, defending our Free and Great Russia, we are prepared to work not eight but twelve hours, and more if necessary and if we have the metal, material, and fuel. We ask you, comrade soldiers, not to believe the various provocative rumours but to select a delegation and send them to see us in the factories … With comradely greetings, the workers of shop no. 3.
Chairman of the meeting, F. Golakhov, Secretary, I. Gavrilov
(Mark D. Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 , New Haven and London 2001)

Diary entry of Georges-Maurice Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia
A disgusting scene was witnessed a few days ago in the Russian Church at Helsingfors. A funeral service was being held for Lieutenant-Commander Polivanov, who was murdered by his crew during the recent disorders. The coffin was open as the orthodox rite prescribes. Suddenly a mob of workmen and sailors burst into the church. The whole lot marched past the catafalque in single file and spat in the dead man’s face. The stricken and weeping widow wiped the sullied features with her handkerchief and implored the brutes to cease their infamous behaviour. But, thrusting her roughly aside, they seized the coffin, turned it upside down, emptied out the corpse, the candles and the wreaths, and left the church bawling the Marseillaise.
(Maurice Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs 1914-1917 , London 1973)

5 April

Diary entry of Georges-Maurice Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia
This morning Milukov gleefully remarked to me: ‘Lenin was a hopeless failure with the Soviet yesterday. He argued the pacifist cause so heatedly, and with such effrontery and lack of tact, that he was compelled to stop and leave the room amidst a storm of booing. He will never survive it.’ I answered him in Russian fashion: ‘God grant it!’ But I very much fear that once again Miliukov will prove the dupe of his own optimism. Lenin’s arrival is in fact represented to me as the most dangerous ordeal the Russian revolution could have to face.
(Maurice Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs 1914-1917 , London 1973)

6 April

Report in The Times (from our own correspondent in the Balkan peninsula)
Odessa: The revolutionary movement pursues its course in Southern Russia with a tranquillity that seems almost miraculous. Here in Odessa there has not been a drop of blood shed. Meetings have been held, orderly demonstrations have taken place in the streets, but there have been no riots. Travelling hither from Jassy last Monday I was unable to discover any symptoms of popular excitement. The railway stations presented their usual aspect. All railway employees and the police have sworn fidelity to the new regime. Trains have become more punctual and supplies of provisions now reach Odessa more regularly. In all this this region a heavy snowfall has been followed by a rapid thaw, and the floods have claimed more victims than the bloodless revolution.
('The Revolution in Southern Russia: Tranquil Transformation', The Times )

8 April

Memoirs of Count Bendendorf
On this day, the officer commanding the incoming Guard was a former sergeant-major who, as soon as he had arrived at the Palace, had made himself conspicuous by his violence and his revolutionary opinions. He wished to search the Palace, threatening everyone with worse treatment if he found anything suspicious. When the Emperor held out his hand, he moved a step back and said, ‘Not for anything in the world.’ Then the Emperor advanced a step and said, ‘What have you got against me?’ He remained open-mouthed, turned on his heel, and left the room.
(Sergei Mironenko, A Lifelong Passion , London 1996)

Report in The Times (by a ‘competent observer, who witnessed the Revolution in Russia, and has just returned to Western Europe')
The most astonishing feature of the whole Revolution was the revelation of the weakness of the Tsar’s hold upon the people, peasants and workmen alike. He was nothing to them, hardly even a name. I have visited several parts of the country since the Revolution, and have nowhere found regret at the abdication of the Tsar. The peasants are far more interested in the local landowners than in the ex-Emperor. They seem scarcely to have been affected by the propaganda for a free distribution of the land, but have in many places expressed a wish to be allowed to buy land at fair prices from the Government. It is true that one peasant woman whom I saw wept on hearing of the abdication of the Tsar. ‘How shall we now say our prayers?’ she asked tearfully. It was explained to her that she could now pray for the Duma. This substitution of the name of the Duma for that of the Tsar is now widespread in Russia: and prayers are daily offered for the welfare and health of the Duma.
('How Tsardom Fell. New Sidelights on the Revolution', The Times )

10 April
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to the Imperial Court
Kerensky dined at the Embassy last night ... and in a long conversation I told him quite frankly why my confidence in the army, and even in the Provisional Government, was shaken. He admitted the accuracy of the facts which I cited, but said that he knew his people and that he only hoped that the Germans would not delay taking the offensive, as, when once the fighting began, the army would pull itself together. He wanted, he said, to make the war a national one, as it was in England and France. He saw no danger of the Provisional Government being overthrown, as only a small minority of the troops were on the side of the Soviet. He added that the Communistic doctrines preached by Lenin have made the Socialists lose ground.
(Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia , London 1923)

Diary entry of Georges-Maurice Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia
Albert Thomas asked to have a talk with me privately in my own room. There he said in a serious but friendly tone: 'Monsieur Ribot [French Minister of Foreign Affairs] has given me a letter for you; he left it to my discretion when I should hand it over to you. I have much too high a regard for you not to give it to you at once. Here it is.' It was dated the 13th April. I read it, without the slightest surprise or emotion ... 'Monsieur l'Ambassadeur ... It has seemed to the Government that your position of favour with the Emperor would make it more difficult for you to carry on your duties under the present government. You will realize that in new circumstances a new man is required, and you have told me, with a delicacy of feeling I highly appreciate, that you were ready to sacrifice yourself by laying aside all personal considerations. I take this opportunity of thanking you for this proof of your disinterestedness, which does not surprise me in a man like you, and of telling you at the same time that we will not forget the great services you have rendered our country.'
(Maurice Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs 1914-1917 , London 1973)

14 April

Memoir by the Menshevik Nikolai Sukhanov
First of all - there can be no doubt about it - Lenin is an extraordinary phenomenon, a man of absolutely exceptional intellectual power ... he represents an unusually happy combination of theoretician and popular leader ... The Bolshevik party was the work of his hands, and his alone. The very thought of going against Lenin was frightening and odious, and required from the Bolshevik mass what it was incapable of giving ... without Lenin, there was nothing and no one in the party.
(N.N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917: a Personal Record , Oxford 1955)


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15 April 2017

Quite an interesting counter-factual piece in Vedomosti , wondering what would have happened if the war had not sapped morale to the extent that it did, and Russia had continued to a victorious conclusion:

Let’s suppose that the arctic conditions didn’t happen, the workers’ protests weren’t so widespread, the demonstrators weren’t harried and so on – and that the Russian empire continued more or less without a hitch until the spring. What would then have happened? Russia, having survived the winter with enormous difficulty, tries with all its might to hold the front. Soldiers are increasingly less keen to fight, but the front holds and Germany is forced to retain the strength of its forces. In April 1917 the USA enters the fray. Since the informal truce between Russia and Turkey doesn’t happen, the advance by English troops into Mesopotamia is far more successful. By the end of 1917 it’s clear that Germany cannot continue the war and the hope that Russia will pull out is not envisaged. Germany capitulates by the end of the year. Russia receives its cherished Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and as victor claims it share in the war indemnity. The army quickly and at times randomly reduces from 7 million men under arms at the end of the war to the pre-war figure of 1.5 million. Another 3 million are released from captivity. Most of them are peasants. They’re embittered, tired of war, they’ve learnt how to kill and handle a weapon. The victorious tsar is garlanded with laurels. The capital celebrates the victory. But who has benefited? The elite, of course … But the land question hasn’t gone away, particularly with the peasants returning from the war to find destruction, sometimes family members killed, land or property taken off them. And this is not all. The country is hit by inflation. Prices are three times higher than before the war. The main pre-war trading partners – Germany and Austro-Hungary – lie in ruins. Industry has been shifted onto a war footing and cannot meet the needs of the population. The regions are populated by refugees, displaced people, prisoners. Everyone wants to get home as quickly as possible. The roads are paralysed by a scarcity of engines and trucks. There’s little bread, but the cities in any case can’t offer the villages goods in exchange for food. Furthermore, the soldiers who have spent time in Europe, especially the Russian expeditionary force that fought in France, are now convinced that life over there is better. As a result, in the spring of 1918 the country undergoes an epidemic of peasant unrest, led by those who fought on the front. Estates are put to the torch, officials are killed, the country comes to a halt. The army doesn’t want to fight against its former comrades-in-arms. In many provinces the soldiers stand alongside the peasants. The cities are beset by uprisings from lack of bread. The Duma accuses the government and tsar of being unable to resolve the peasant issue. Political activity becomes more extreme, particularly in the case of the Socialist Revolutionary party. A huge number of soviets are created as an alternative source of authority.

The end result, the author concludes, of this ‘alternative history’ is almost certainly revolution, removal of the tsar, and a bitter civil war; in other words, what actually happened, just delayed by a year or so. The key event was therefore not the revolution as such but Russia’s involvement in the First World War, which was little short of inevitable. It was this, he suggests, which led to the ‘catastrophe of 1917’.